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Abstract
Distributive justice relies on metaphors about spatial distribution.
Modelling cross-temporal relations on cross-spatial relations in this way
obscures how earlier groups become the later ones. Procedural justice
metaphors rely on metaphors of (contemporaneous) contract and thereby
on impartial reasoning. Their dominance is already problematic in the
case of contemporary relations, but is even more so in the case of
relations across time, where the conditions for later parties are controlled
and created by earlier ones. Future generations should not be thought of
as a distinct group living at a different temporal “location,” but as who
we will become. Thus, the frame of “justice” is much less appropriate
for our relations to them than the frame of “care”.
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I. Introduction
The human race faces an unprecedented ecological crisis. Philosophers
are typically alive to this, but tend1 to think its challenges can be risen to
by means of adapting traditional conceptual tools, especially by extending
our notion of justice. This paper considers the limitations of the justice
metaphor – for a metaphor is what it is – for adequately capturing the
range of moral obligations that we have to future human beings (as well
as to others in the present).
The justice metaphor has had widespread appeal for philosophers in
thinking about future people in the first instance because it is the default
way in which modern moral/political philosophers think ethically about
all people. We regard the justice metaphor as a welcome improvement
on ethically blind CBA-based [Cost-Benefit Analysis] approaches. And
our concerns with relying on the justice metaphor to offer moral protec-
tion to future generations are not because of any scepticism as to their
moral worth: quite the contrary! We shall argue that it is not in the final
analysis meaningful or helpful to think of future people as merely our
equals in the sense in which this is understood under “distributive jus-
tice” approaches. In Section II we outline why the various approaches to
intergenerational justice (as outlined, for example, by Gosseries2 ) all
problematically buy into a common set of justice metaphors. This set
functions largely unquestioningly as the paradigm defining intergenera-
tional moral obligations, in so far as they are held to exist at all. As we
shall elucidate, most challenges to the notion of intergenerational justice
1. There are, of course, important exceptions. We discuss below (critically) utilitarian
approaches to future-ethics. And, most notably: we ourselves build in what follows on the
important and growing “care” tradition in ethics and political philosophy. See for instance
Fiona Robinsons’s “Global care ethics: beyond distribution, beyond justice” (Journal of
Global Ethics 9:2 (2013: 131–143), a paper which, superficially, might sound highly similar
to our own. And indeed we find Robinson’s approach broadly conducive. To anticipate
briefly the argument of our paper, some important differences are: (i) unlike us, she does
not challenge the pre-eminence of “theoreticism”; she does not propose (as we do) a
metaphor-based approach. And (ii) crucially, she does not consider the salience of time as a
limit on the extent to which distributive justice is an appropriate frame. Someone in this
tradition who does explicitly consider the salience of time is Michael Slote, who has been
a key figure in the mainstream incorporation of feminist thinking about care in recent
years. Again, we find Slote’s general approach helpful. Unfortunately, his thinking about
time is one of the weakest points in his work. Slote argues that we invariably have stron-
ger obligations to those who are temporally immediate than to those who are temporally
distant, and that an ethics of empathic caring can capture this point. We will argue, on
the contrary, that always preferring the present to the future involves a failure to register
the distinctiveness of our relationship with the future and of its call upon us. There are some
circumstances in which we should privilege obligations to future people. (To get a sense of
the difference between ourselves and Slote on this key point, see especially The ethics of
care and empathy (London: Routledge, 2007: 27)).
2. Gosseries (2008).
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to date are made by those seeking to question the very basis for assigning
moral worth to future generations. That is, those that defend the notion
of intergenerational justice take themselves largely also – and simultane-
ously – to be defending the moral relevance of future generations at all.
However, we aim to question the ambition of making “intergenerational
justice” one’s exclusive aim, and to propose instead a complementary
and partly substitutive3 aim, one that is at least as important (and, in our
view, actually much more apposite).
We think, in fact, that the only way ultimately of treating future peo-
ple fully seriously is to not merely to treat them via a “justice”-based
approach, which has its home in relations between present people,4 and
in interactions across space rather than time. This is in so far as: (i)
Distributive justice relies on metaphors about spatial distribution – we
will argue that modelling cross-temporal relations directly on cross-spatial
relations in this way is morally misleading and obscures how earlier
groups become the later one(s); and (ii) Procedural justice metaphors rely
on metaphors of (contemporaneous) contract and negotiation and
thereby on impartial reasoning. We will argue here that their dominance
is already limited and problematic in the case of contemporary relations,
but that it is even more so in the case of relations across time, where the
conditions for later parties are controlled and created by earlier ones.
Rather, we argue in Section III, intergenerational moral relationships
need to be conceived of by foregrounding developmental metaphors
– the emergence of later generations from current and past generations
– and moral reasoning modelled more strongly on conceptual metaphors
of care. For, following Wittgenstein,5 we do not propose an alternative
theory to replace justice metaphors nor advocate a monistic ethic for inter-
generational relations. Rather, we advocate developing a (different) range
of moral metaphors in different ethical cases to aid moral thinking, and
focus here on highlighting the limitations in the justice metaphors that
3. I.e. “Intergenerational justice” can be useful, but should be less frequently used as the
primary framing of intergenerational moral/political relationships.
4. Such that, unfortunately, the case of future generations is frequently presented as an
outlier, a “special” case (whereas in our view, by contrast, it ought to be the central case).
Here is an egregious, influential example of such a presentation: Brian Barry refers to “the
rather strange case of future generations”, by contrast with “more familiar cases”. (This is
from his “Intergenerational Justice in Energy Policy” in MacLean and Brown’s Energy and
the Future (Totowa, NJ: Rowman, 1983: 18).) As we shall explain, we see taking care of
future generations as something like the first virtue of human institutions.
5. There is no further explicit reference to Wittgenstein in the present paper. But those
who understand Wittgenstein’s post-theoreticist philosophical sensibility will, we think,
see his influence implicitly, over and over again, herein. In this sense, our paper has an
affinity with what Rosalind Hursthouse says of her thoroughly Wittgensteinian book On
Virtue Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 1999: 16), a work which similarly does not, except on that
page, refer to Wittgenstein explicitly at all.
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have become overly dominant in the case of intergenerational moral
relationships (but which we are not seeking to eliminate entirely), and
on other metaphors that we think it helpful to allot a stronger role to in
moral discourse. In the case of both (i) and (ii), our suggestion is that an
ultimate commitment to caring about the beings in question is what
underlies (and can be unfortunately effaced by, and should sometimes
replace) the commitment to justice.
II. The limits of the justice paradigm for thinking about the future
II. i Best cases for the justice paradigm
Let us think for a moment about how justice-talk works in the present.
Take “Justice for janitors”6 : a good case for use of the distributive jus-
tice paradigm for thinking about the present, in that it seeks a fairer dis-
tribution of economic resources between janitors and other economic
actors (as well as calling for better working conditions, etc.). However, it
should be noted:
a) It remains the case that the reason we care about justice for janitors
has its roots beyond justice. It has to do with caring about janitors: car-
ing about fellow human beings.
b) Also: justice is a mitigatory ethic. One might almost say that it is a
necessary evil, in a society that is deeply imperfect. But let us not
“make a virtue out of a necessity” and fool ourselves into thinking
that justice then becomes truly a “first virtue” in the Rawlsian sense!7
It should not be represented as a genuinely utopian project in this
regard. It seems like the best we can have because of how thoroughly
economically liberal our society is. This is a point then about how
justice is a virtue for a society that may be overcome: a point about
the possible (limited) future of justice.8
These two points, (a) and (b), are linked by the virtue of care being,
we claim, an underlying basis for our society that to some extent makes
6. See e.g. http://justiceforjanitors.ca/.
7. Rawls 1971, A Theory of Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. For a Wittgen-
steinian critique of Rawls’s claim to have established that justice is the “first virtue” of
political philosophy, see Rupert Read’s “Wittgenstein vs. Rawls”, published in V. Munz,
K. Puhl and J. Wang (eds) Proceedings of the Kirchberg Wittgenstein Symposium 2009: Lan-
guage and World (Frankfurt: Ontos, 2010).
8. Cf. in this context the useful work of Buchanan (Buchanan, Allen E., Marx and Jus-
tice, Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), who interprets Marx as arguing that tools of justice
and rights only become necessary in a liberal capitalist society, to correct for the systemic
manufacturing of conflict between individuals in such a society.
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justice irrelevant or at best secondary now, and that could do so to a
greater extent in (and for) the future.
However, it is important to note that our concern with this limitation
of distributive justice is not also a criticism of equality. The two are not
synonymous, and whereas the normal view is that one might be in
favour of distributive justice but not necessarily of equality (because fair-
ness need not, allegedly, require equality of anything), our view is less
common: we argue that one should be in favour of equality but not nec-
essarily of distributive justice.9
Now let us turn to a good case (we can think of none better) for rela-
tively unapologetic application of the distributive justice paradigm to our
relations between generations: thinking about spreading the burden of
pension-requirements fairly across generations.10 This is reasonable to
take as a case of justice because thinking about interest rates can be used
as a partial basis for determining how to distribute pools of money and
burdens of payment. However, this case faces not only the two problems
described in the previous paragraph but also the additional problem that
calculations about the wealth of the next generation depend critically
upon assumptions about economic “growth” – and that these assump-
tions are subject to the constraints we inevitably face in a world pressed
up against the ecological limits to growth.11 When we start thinking
ecologically, we can no longer think purely distributively. Moreover,
pensions-policy, to boil it down to its simplest form, requires that chil-
dren pay their parents’ pensions. But this requires us to think adequately
about the relationship of parents to children. Doing so will be the bur-
den of the latter part of the present paper. And what we shall seek to
show is that this relationship cannot be understood adequately as a rela-
tionship of justice (or injustice).
So: there are cases where a reasonably decent case can be made for
talking meaningfully about distributive “intergenerational justice”. But
9. See on this, for example, Read’s (2011).
10. For example, as Willetts frames the debate, e.g.: Willetts, David M.P., “Baby boomers
can’t leave the younger generation to pick up the pensions bill”, http://www.the-
guardian.com/society/joepublic/2010/feb/10/baby-boomer-pensions-ageing-population
(Although this is not to suggest agreement with the policy that he advocates).
11. See, for example, Meadows et al. (2005); Rockstr€om, J., W. Steffen, K. Noone, A.
Persson, F. S. Chapin, III, E. Lambin, T. M. Lenton, M. Scheffer, C. Folke, H.
Schellnhuber, B. Nykvist, C. A. De Wit, T. Hughes, S. van der Leeuw, H. Rodhe, S.
S€orlin, P. K. Snyder, R. Costanza, U. Svedin, M. Falkenmark, L. Karlberg, R. W. Corell,
V. J. Fabry, J. Hansen, B. Walker, D. Liverman, K. Richardson, P. Crutzen, and J. Foley,
(2009) “Planetary boundaries: exploring the safe operating space for humanity”. Ecology
and Society 14(2): 32; and The Post-Growth Project (eds. Blewitt, John and Cunningham,
Ray; London: London Publishing Partnership, 2014).
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even the best of these cases face a series of serious limitations with justice
as the exclusive metaphor.
In the case of procedural justice it is more obvious how it works well
in the present: as the formal ideal for the organisation of law courts. This
is the paradigm from which all other cases of procedural justice initially
spring, such as its importance for international negotiations.12 (Procedural
justice might eventually start to wither away as the law itself did – but it
requires a utopian ambition exceeding ours to take this possibility, ges-
tured at in Marx, very seriously, because it requires imagining the end of
criminality, or at least a very different way of dealing with and conceptu-
alising criminality.13 )
However, when one seeks to extend procedural justice across time, it
quickly breaks down into absurdity. Procedural justice is robust for well-
defined institutional circumstances in the here and now, in such para-
digm cases as the law courts – it is hopeless, we will argue in II.iii, as a
way of seeking to include our descendants whose lives will not overlap
with ours.
II. ii Motivation for a new methodology
It may seem to underplay the richness of the literature on intergenera-
tional justice to seek, as we are doing, to draw attention to its significant
limitations in the case of our obligations to future generations. For this
literature hosts a wide range of different theories of intergenerational jus-
tice – for example, libertarian, communitarian, contractarian, reciprocity-
based.14 Given that people are already aware of and responsive to key
problems facing intergenerational applications (such as non-identity and
non-reciprocity, discussed below) and seeking to accommodate them
within justice theories, how, then, can we contend that one might want
to start thinking about intergenerational moral relationships in terms
other than justice? Surely we cannot be doing justice justice.
However, we are unconvinced by the very idea that moral and politi-
cal philosophy should be in the business of devising theories. Rather, it
should seek to discuss and draw from (often multiple) distinct moral meta-
12. See, for example, “Ethical Issue Eight” of the Tuana et al. (2006) White paper on the
ethical dimensions of climate change. Pennsylvania State University, PA: Rock Ethics Institute.
13. Some useful indications of what this latter might involve are to be found in Jared
Diamond’s (2012) The world since yesterday: What can we learn from traditional societies? Lon-
don: Penguin. Diamond in effect shows in this book how “justice” is a frame well-suited
only for large, anonymous societies. In smaller scale situations, among people who have at
least some kind of connection with each other, what matters is restoration of relations
rather than a blind sense of right or wrong.
14. Gosseries, Axel and Meyer, Lukas H. (eds.) (2009).
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phors which may be more or less helpful. Metaphors which make maximal
sense of the domain in question: which shed light on it more helpfully
than others, and that lead our thinking (and action) in fruitful rather than
harmful directions. One should do this in a way that preserves, moreover,
one’s understanding that these are metaphors, and thus preserve and
enhance one’s intellectual “autonomy,” one’s capacity as a thinker.
We are concerned then that justice-based approaches to moral and
political reasoning have come to serve, for their proponents, as a justice
“paradigm” that frames all moral discussion of intergenerational reason-
ing; a paradigm whereby advocates attach so strongly to several com-
monly held and centrally placed justice metaphors that they barely
recognise that there might be other ways of thinking ethically about
these relationships. Indeed, most criticism of the intergenerational justice
framework comes from (weak15 ) environmental sceptics; from those,
such as Beckerman and Pasek, who would question the very idea of the
existence of strong moral obligations to future generations. This is alleg-
edly because, firstly, their current non-existence means they cannot be
assigned rights that would “trump” over those of present generations,16
and secondly, while they may still have moral standing, they are assumed
to be richer than the current generations17 and their interests are thereby
thought to be less worthy of attention than threats to the human rights
of contemporaries.18 So for those defending strong intergenerational
moral obligations against these kinds of arguments, such moral obliga-
tions have simply become synonymous with the notion of intergenera-
tional justice. Tremmel, for example, describes the latter as “the ethics of
the future” that defines the “new ethics of future responsibility”.19
But this is despite the ongoing struggle (as with much of moral phi-
losophy) to find a theory that is in fact an adequate “match” for moral
intuitions; in particular, to deal with the inadequacies of theories of jus-
tice intergenerationally. For instance, while Gosseries notes that “our
philosophical theories on justice fall astonishingly short of expectations in
attempting to deal with the normative issues raised by environmental and
resource depletion problems,”20 he nevertheless supposes that every time
we come across new and relevant environmental concepts – such as
15. That is, they are not sceptical of the existence of serious environmental problems such
as anthropogenic climate change.
16. Beckerman and Pasek (2001).
17. Beckerman and Pasek (2001: 105). As made clear in our invocation of Meadows et al.
(2005), amongst others, we contest this rash assumption (unfortunately largely shared by
Rawls) vigorously!
18. Beckerman and Pasek (2001: 123).
19. Tremmel (2009).
20. Gosseries (2008: 61).
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“sustainable development”, “ecological debt,” “ecological footprint” –
these must be “retranslated every time into the specific language of each
theory of justice”. This, for Gosseries, is a challenge, but is not, crucially,
taken as a sign that some other ethical discourse might be needed as well
or indeed even instead. While on paper he acknowledges the theoretical
possibility that we might in principle require “a complete revision” of
justice theories, in practice he always seems rather to suppose that the
“existing language – in this case theories of justice – painstakingly con-
structed by successive generations of practitioners provide[s] sufficient
vocabulary to deal with the issues in hand”.21 In the rest of this paper,
however, we present some reasons to think that our moral reasoning
about future people (and indeed about relationships with non-humans
and even our human contemporaries) is made plain-misleading by having
to be wedded so strongly to this justice discourse, and obscures otherwise
important features of these moral relationships. We describe, in II.iii and
II.iv., the problems we find for intergenerational relationships with the
central families of metaphors used by theories of distributive and proce-
dural justice, respectively, and explain why the various families of theo-
ries of justice (as outlined primarily by Gosseries22 ) all problematically
adhere to these metaphors.
II. iii The Distributive Justice Metaphor(s)
Let us offer some leading examples of the distributive justice metaphor,
presented typically as the main alternative to CBA approaches in envi-
21. Gosseries (2008: 62). To put the matter for a moment in broadly Kuhnian terms:
we say that the justice “paradigm” is in crisis, and is becoming “monstrous”, as Coperni-
cus said of the Ptolemaic system, in its efforts to get through this crisis. However, we
think that to think that what one is doing is providing a theory – to think of one’s enter-
prise as broadly scientific – is part of the problem, rather than of the solution. Better even
than for justice advocates to think of themselves as having a paradigm in crisis that has
grown monstrous, would be, in our way of seeing things, for them to come to see that
they have never really had a paradigm at all, only the illusion of one, or at very best a
fragment of one. Gosseries himself comes excruciatingly close to recognising this problem,
and acknowledging at least the need for multiple perspectives within a broad justice
framework. He argues, in his concluding observations on various theories of justice, that
they “provide resources for thinking not just along different lines, but also for broaching
the issue of intergenerational justice through the prism of various logics which. . .can gen-
erate a multiplicity of implications. This is particularly true once the ultra-simplified world
represented here is enriched with a set of additional variables to bring it closer to the real
world. Each of these theories can respond differently for example to demographic fluctua-
tions.” (p69). However, his quasi-scientistic language and refusal to depart from the lan-
guage of theory means that he fails to provide the kind of basis for liberating ethical
thinking more fully from its over-attachment to particular metaphors, and from recognising
them as such.
22. Gosseries (2008).
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ronmental policy, in particular, in climate change literature. Take for
instance the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, which describes
intergenerational equity as “The fairness of the distribution of the costs
and benefits of a policy when costs and benefits are borne by different
generations”.23 Even more explicitly, Page understands intergenerational
justice as part of the same “set of questions” for “global distributive jus-
tice” vis-a-vis climate change, that is, “how benefits and burdens should
be distributed within and between generations”.24 And Anand and Sen
have proclaimed that our obligations to future generations are “a matter
of distributional equity”.25 Crucially, this conception of intergenerational
equity or justice goes beyond a more general concern for intergenera-
tional obligations; “the basic belief,” which Anand and Sen also express,
“that the interests of future generations should receive the same kind of
attention that those in the present generation get”.26 Rather, the concept
asserts that such attention be interpreted distributionally. And distribution
means, roughly, primordially: taking a bunch of stuff, and divvying it up.
Under this view, one’s moral obligations to future generations should
be determined by one’s principle of justice. Page thus analyses our obli-
gations to future generations according to one’s views as to the “cur-
rency,” “shape” and “scope” of justice27 ; that is what it is that should
be distributed fairly, whether according to (e.g.) equality, priority or suf-
ficiency, and which people count as relevant for such just distributions.
Under this family of approaches, we fail to meet our obligations to
future people and treat them unjustly when we fail to ensure that dis-
tributive patterns between generations meet the particular distributional
principle advocated.28
Aspects of this influential approach seem reasonable and attractive. In
particular, its grounding in the kind of appeal made by Anand and Sen
to the “universalism” of the “shared claim” that all humans have “the
basic capability to lead worthwhile lives”29 highlights the needs of (and
the meaningfulness of the lives of) those living in the future. Our use of
“resources”30 now can diminish their ecological conditions and abilities
to meet their needs – can, in this sense, leave them less than we have.
23. http://www.c2es.org/science-impacts/basics/glossary.
24. Page (2007: 225), our emphasis.
25. Anand and Sen (2000), discussed in the context of sustainability.
26. Anand and Sen (2000: 2030).
27. Page (2006: 50–51).
28. Since the aim is to establish the just “profile of benefits and burdens that we should
aim for in our dealings with contemporaries and future generations”, Page (2006: 96).
29. Anand and Sen (2000: 2030).
30. We have scare-quoted this word because of broadly Heideggerian worries that talk
of “resources” inclines one tacitly to figure the Earth as one gigantic mine (and refuse-
tip). We recommend the interested reader to consult Heidegger’s (1977).
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This approach can provide a helpful counter to the dominant economic
and political practices of aggregation and discounting of the future costs
of dangerous climate change against the current benefits of refraining
from mitigation, by framing the relationship in terms of distributive fair-
ness. But the extension of this metaphor – the thinking of intertemporal
distributional justice as strictly analogous to interspatial distributional jus-
tice – is problematic when it becomes “attached to”31 as the primary
(and often exclusive) method of conceptualising intertemporal relations.32
It is attractive to extend thinking about distribution over space – because
one has (allegedly) already got a theory of this – to thinking about distri-
bution over time. It makes one’s task as a philosopher of the future (de-
ceptively) easy. It is exactly this attraction that has to be exposed to
view, and turned into the difficulty that it actually hides.
The intergenerational scenario is distinct from contemporary relations
in a very particular way that is relevant here; time is uni-directional and
manifests crucial asymmetries between generations: the very existence of
one party depends entirely on the actions of the other. Aspects of this
feature have been depicted in Parfit’s problem of “non-identity”,33
which is often presented, as with many other features of intergenera-
tional relationships, as a “challenge” that theories of justice need to be
able to accommodate.34 Parfit draws attention to the fact that the very
existence of future people is contingent on current policy decisions; dif-
ferent people are likely to be born as a result of different decisions. But,
he asks, how can future people then be said to be harmed (e.g. through
failing to implement an environmentally protective policy) if those par-
ticular individuals who would exist are different to those who would
have existed under a different policy choice? For, Parfit suggests, harm-
ing a person is normally understood as making things worse for that per-
son. We cannot have made things worse for future people if they would
otherwise not have existed – different individuals would have lived and
experienced the better set of conditions created by the alternative policy.
31. When we speak of “attaching” to ideas or metaphors, we have in mind the Buddhist
understanding of this term. In this sense, we are suggesting that philosophers, especially
political philosophers, need to practice “non-attachment” to their preferred vocabularies,
on pain of otherwise being imprisoned by them.
32. Even if, as has become philosophical etiquette, justice-theorists acknowledge in prin-
ciple that justice does not exhaust our moral obligations, very little is ever made of what
else these might in fact constitute. This is most evident amongst political liberals such as
Rawls (1993), Barry (1995) and Nussbaum (2006), who define a political conception of
justice which is shared by and which ranges over various comprehensive conceptions of
morality. But it was also present in Rawls prior to his development of “political liberal-
ism”. See also Beckerman and Pasek (2001: 14), and Page (2007: 3).
33. Parfit (1984).
34. Gosseries and Meyer (2009: 3).
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These are “different people choices”.35 And if no person has been made
worse off by the policy, how can it be said to be harmful?36
However, we have concerns with the very framing of the problem,
for it stems from the way in which we deal with harms intragenera-
tionally, and attempts to apply this to a very different kind of context –
intergenerational morality. That is, it only becomes a problem in trying to
fit intergenerational relationships to the mould created by contemporary
relations (here, notions of harm). Parfit and others do of course recognise
that key features of intergenerational moral relationships are very differ-
ent from those among contemporaries: the very purpose of the non-
identity problem is to look for the “moral reason”37 which explains our
intuitions if it cannot simply be that particular peoples’ lives are made
worse in “different people choices”. But in seeking to offer such further
explanations and search for “theory X” which tell us “which set of prin-
ciples. . . we ought to accept”38 as justifying our intuitions, theorists are
attempting to apply the rules from one kind of case to another, which
may not constitute a helpful or appropriate model. Indeed, we submit
that in certain important respects intergenerational relationships are not
analogous to intragenerational ones; we create future generations and
their conditions, and should not think of them as in any way “already
existing” at another temporal “location”.39 This structure, and our intu-
itions about how to deal with it, should rather be seen as constituting a
different kind of case40 that requires insight from other, additional meta-
phors, and which cannot be explained in terms of more fundamental
principles, or a wholesale theory to “explain” them. Non-identity only
seems to pose a problem when we try to import inappropriate modes of
ethical thinking.
What we are suggesting here is that non-identity should not be
regarded as a problematic issue for moral thinking about intergenera-
tional relationships (construed as just a special case of our ordinary inter-
actions). Rather, it should be foregrounded as part of an alternative,
35. Parfit (1984: 356).
36. NB Parfit’s point here is not to suggest that it is not wrong to impact future people in
this way. Rather his point is to ask how it is possible to understand this as wrong, and
what “theory” we should adopt that will support our intuitions that harm has been done,
if particular individuals cannot be said to have been harmed according to a comparative
view of harm.
37. Parfit (1984: 363).
38. Parfit (1984: 361).
39. On the wider disanalogy between time and space, see Read (2003), “Against
‘Time–Slices’.” Philosophical Investigations 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2003: See p33 and p24,
footnote 1).
40. This is not to say that we need to create a whole new set of claims and intuitions. . .
they exist already in the way in which we think about future generations in other con-
texts – as, e.g., our children, as we outline in Section III.
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complementary and, we would advise, more dominant set of metaphors.
The central moral question becomes, not “who is harmed by our
actions?” but, “what kinds of future lives and circumstances should we
facilitate in coming to be?”. Or, again: “what kinds of future are we
leaving to the beings, whoever precisely they will turn out to be, who
will constitute our posterity?”
We now consider the failure of the distributive justice metaphor, as
depicted in various theories of justice (manifested through particular dis-
tributive principles regarding the “currency” and “shape” of distributive
justice41 ), to make focal what is the focal feature of intergenerational
relationships that underlies the problem of non-identity: the uni-direc-
tionality of time, and the creation of (conditions for) future generations
by previous ones. While we will suggest that some theories (e.g. some
versions of sufficientarianism) seem to struggle less than others in this
regard, this is because they have already started to borrow tacitly from
what we will tentatively call a model of developmental health, a meta-
phor that should be made primary and explicit.
Let us start with broadly egalitarian approaches, whereby the distribu-
tive justice metaphor can seem to imply that what is morally required is
a broad equality in distribution (of goods, or well-being) between gener-
ations. This seems to represent a relatively progressive position in the
case of contemporary relations. But in an intergenerational context, it
risks inviting concerns that in “saving” for a future generation, a previ-
ous generation could leave them too much. Indeed, Solow has worry-
ingly put forward just such a suggestion, which it is worth reproducing
in full:42
You could make a good case that our ancestors, who were considerably
poorer than we are, whose standard of living was considerably less than
our own, were probably excessively generous in providing for us. They
cut down a lot of trees, but they saved a lot and they built a lot of rail-
road rights-of-way. Both privately and publicly they probably did better
by us than a sort of fair-minded judge in thinking about the equity
(whether they got their share and we got our share or whether we
profited at their expense) would have required. It would have been
okay for them to save a little less, to enjoy a little more and give us a
little less of a start than our generation has had.
This is both conceptually and morally problematic. We will return to
further concerns about adopting the perspective of a “fair-minded judge”
in Section II.iv. But for now note that the distributive metaphor here is
conceptually misleading; by definition, the process of learning and the
41. Page (2006: 50–51).
42. Cited (uncritically) in Anand and Sen (2000: 2035).
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development of knowledge and technology means that any resulting
improvements to the standard of living of future generations could not
be meaningfully distributed more fairly between generations. In terms of
the improvements brought by such development,43 future people will
necessarily have “more” or “better” in some senses than previous genera-
tions – this is simply the notion of development (and of learning).
Solow, as a development economist, is clearly aware of this.44 But its
implications are overlooked in nonetheless considering this development
distributionally, as though between two discrete societies, already existing
in different temporal (as opposed to spatial) “locations”, rather than as a
process whereby one emerges from the other. For it is a necessary fea-
ture of development that future generations of any functioning society
will “profit” at the “expense” (sic.) of previous generations.
There is also something morally abhorrent about the idea that we
should withhold improvements to human society simply because more
of the benefits are experienced by future people. We surely want if pos-
sible to improve our societies for the better, to leave future generations
– our descendants – a better world than the one we inhabit, to improve
their chances of surviving, flourishing and living fulfilling and secure
lives. Indeed, some would say – and we would tend to agree – that this
is the central purpose of many people’s lives (especially obviously, per-
haps, for parents)! However, as Anand and Sen suggest, the “universal-
ism” in an intergenerational distributive equity perspective implies “an
obligation to preserve the present-day economic opportunities (such as
productive capacity) for the future, not necessarily to increase them”.45
Rawls, on the other hand, does seem to conceive of his own, notion-
ally egalitarian46 notion of “just savings” in the context of building and
improving ones society or civilisation, and criticises those who have
lamented the “chronological unfairness” of this directionality.47 This,
then, is an improvement. Rawls claims that the “just savings principle
can be regarded as an understanding between generations to carry their
fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society. . . dur-
ing the whole course of a society’s history”.48 But it is difficult to see
43. This is not to suggest that all development does bring improvements, or, where it
does, that it always brings uniform improvements to subsequent generations. Far from it!
(We are in this connection, often sympathetic to critics of developmentality such as Deb,
Lohmann, and Norberg-Hodge.).
44. Indeed, he offers a similar criticism of applying a maximin principle to intergenera-
tional relationships: see Solow (1974: 33).
45. Anand and Sen (2000: 2035).
46. Just Savings is ordinarily considered as a form of intergenerational “Rawlsian Egali-
tarianism” (sic.) (Gosseries (2008: 68).
47. Rawls (1971: 291).
48. Rawls (1971: 289).
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why this idea should be understood in terms of distributive justice as
Rawls wants – how, if later generations are properly to enjoy a better
life than previous ones, it makes sense to talk of the intergenerational
“understanding” in terms of a just distribution between generations at
all. That is, Rawls is still overly caught up within an attachment to dis-
tributionalist frames and metaphors.
The distributionalist framing may seem plausible from Rawls’s
description of the generational burden (the savings left by one generation
for the next), as a “fair equivalent in real capital. . . in return for what is
received from previous generations”.49 But what he means by a “fair
equivalent” is not an economically equivalent quantity (which would, in
any case seem odd to require of each generation, with different circum-
stances and different challenges). It is, in fact, “what is reasonable for
members of adjacent generations to expect of one another at each level
of advance. . . balancing how much at each stage they would be willing
to save for their immediate descendants against what they would feel
entitled to claim of their immediate predecessors”,50 That is, there is a
different “rate. . . for all stages”. This continues until the “last stage at
which saving is required”, after which sufficient wealth has been accu-
mulated to bring about “the full realization of just institutions and the
fair value of liberty”.
But this way of understanding intergenerational relations is worrying.
One would need to significantly stretch this metaphor to apply it to dan-
gerous climate change, or other environmental crises. For Rawls imagi-
nes society like a savings account – where a regular investment over
time (in socio-economic infrastructure) can provide regular interest
repayments (i.e. the wealth generated from this size of economy) which
increase in size until it has accumulated enough for society to live justly
and sufficiently from the interest.51 But, even if we (generously) assume
that the savings need not represent accumulation, but a curb on each
generation’s use rate of natural resources and pollution sinks, it is not
clear why the process of defining different appropriate savings rates at
each stage is best understood as one of “just savings”, or fairness. Such a
characterisation is worrying, especially when Rawls says (foreshadowing
Solow, cited above) that just savings “places an upper bound on how
49. Rawls (1971: 288), where “capital” is “knowledge and culture. . . techniques and
skills” as well as “factories and machines”. This is on balance a sadly-outmoded “produc-
tivist” vision of “capital”, ill-suited for a post-growthist age.
50. Rawls (1971: 289).
51. Although, in terms of the economy’s size, this latter point is preferable to assuming
a need for continuous economic accumulation, which Rawls correctly counters in this
section, arguing that “great wealth is not required” for a “just and good society”. Rawls
(1971: 190).
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much a generation can be asked to save for the welfare of later genera-
tions. . . Each age is to do its fair share. . . but beyond this more cannot
be required”.52
For example, if the concern of intergenerational equity or justice for
future generations is to ensure equivalent burdens are placed on each
generation, then the scenarios posed by dangerous climate change will
create morally dubious outcomes. On the one hand, since burdens to
future generations from dangerous climate change will be significantly
heavier than those to current generations if we do not adequately miti-
gate emissions, an egalitarian intergenerational distributive justice
approach might require reasonably radical mitigation targets so long as
equivalent intergenerational burdens or levels of well-being were likely.
However, on the other hand, the current and emerging generation, in
committing to any such “burdens” or drop in standard of living, could
be arguably treated inequitably vis-a-vis the previous generation, which
(at least in industrialised countries) benefited from high emitting devel-
opment but which increased the burdens from dangerous climate change
and the concomitant requirement for significant cuts if further tempera-
ture rises are to be avoided. To treat our generation “fairly” (in terms of
a “fair equivalent”) might then seem to imply less radical climate-
change-mitigation targets.
Furthermore, the prospect of radical mitigation targets might seem
unfair if the current generation is considered in comparison to further
future generations. For, if extremely strong mitigation efforts were suc-
cessful in averting a 2°C global mean temperature rise,53 once low/zero-
emissions infrastructure is in place, further future generations could con-
ceivably end up substantially better off in many respects and facing fewer
burdens than the current generation. This could be deemed unfair from
the perspective of intergenerational justice but would surely be morally
preferable to a more nominally “just” outcome, where the current generation
only marginally diminishes its average54 standard of living, but future
generations increasingly suffer the impacts of increased temperature rises.
Rawls’s advocacy of an intergenerationally distributive principle of
each generation’s leaving a “fair equivalent” is similar to reciprocity-
based theories of distributive justice. As is well-noted in literature on
intergenerational justice, theories based on reciprocity themselves face
the additional “problem” that intergenerational relationships are typically
52. Rawls (1971: 298).
53. The temperature rise considered in international climate agreements to be dangerous
(although we would follow others in arguing that this threshold should be set at 1.5°C or
indeed lower).
54. We use “average” standard of living because of intragenerational inequities, which
may and should be reduced.
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characterised by non-overlapping generations, and therefore by non-reci-
procity.
Page has highlighted, for example, that “The vast majority of future
individuals that will benefit from the modest amount of climate change
avoided will never be in a position to repay the present generation for
their sacrifice”55 since the latter will no longer be living. Page calls this
the “non-reciprocity problem”,56 and emphasises instead the model of
indirect reciprocity,57 whereby we reciprocate for the benefits we receive
by passing these on to future generations. We return in the next sec-
tion to the significant problems with the procedural contractual meta-
phors that typically underpin reciprocity theories, the challenge of
“non-overlapping generations”.58 But to deal with, for now, the distri-
butional principles implied by such a theory: indirect reciprocity means
that we have no such intergenerational duties if we have not received
certain benefits. Page is explicit, for example, in stipulating that “there
can be no duty of fair reciprocity to pass on what one has not
received”.59 But to justify the “sacrifices” of current generations in tak-
ing mitigative action against climate change, he is then forced to
assume that “members of the present generation have been bequeathed
an atmospheric system largely devoid of dangerous impacts”, that is,
because such mitigative action could only be justified under indirect
reciprocity if it involves passing forward benefits that we have received
ourselves.60 However, it is not any longer clear that we have received
such benefits. While rising concentrations will significantly worsen the
harms from dangerous climate change in future, the changes to the cli-
mate system (e.g. in terms of increased incidence of severe storms) that
we have already inherited are such that Page’s assumption of a healthy
climate system can, to put it mildly, no longer be made with confi-
dence. This perspective could worryingly undermine the case for mit-
igative action, and makes our obligations to future generations oddly
dependent on having already received equivalent environmental benefits
from previous generations.
This echoes Gosseries’s analogous concern with reciprocity as a theory
of even contemporary justice: that, in “the case of a person with multiple
congenital disabilities,” if it turns out that she gives us “less in return for
what society gave to her,” this will undermine any further obligations to
care for her (or for any other similarly dependent person) that we might
55. Page (2007: 231).
56. Ibid.
57. Originally proposed by Brian Barry (1991), referenced by Gosseries (2008: 63).
58. Gosseries and Meyer (2009: 3).
59. (2007: 237).
60. Ibid.
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otherwise feel.61 But, we would also note that the set-up in the first
place of Gosseries’s (counter-)example under the distributive justice
metaphor reads profoundly uncomfortably; the very idea that we could
make full sense of someone’s “giving” less or more as an aggregative sum
of their societal contribution, including not only economic productivity,
but love, social bonds, community. . . is to misunderstand the meaning
and value of these contributions as precisely not quantifiable, nor com-
mensurable with other forms of “capital” (sic.). These are not the sorts of
things that it makes sense to think about distributively.
Similarly, we would argue, applying metaphors of distribution to
intergenerational relationships is a misleading way to consider and
define obligations to future generations when it comes to environmen-
tal change, when what is at stake is the health, development and resili-
ence of our ecosystems; our ecological pre-conditions, rather than
simply a stockpile of a resource being distributed. This is true equally
of theories of justice that turn instead on intergenerational applications
of the Lockean Proviso – to leave “enough and as good”62 for others.
(Such a distributional framing contains a presumption that we need pri-
marily to compare intertemporal stockpiles of “stuff”, and (at best)
maintain these, rather than to develop or nurture living systems or
entities.)
This is “sufficientarianism”.63 Such approaches are to some extent
preferable to other intergenerational distributive principles. As Meyer
and Roser argue, strong sufficientarianism is able to better accommodate
many of the particular features that characterise intergenerational rela-
tions, such as uncertainty about the future and non-overlapping genera-
tions.64 In particular, it can deal with “non-identity,” since, rather than
relying on an understanding of harm as a worsened state of affairs for
some particular individuals(s) (which, as discussed earlier, can mean that
future people cannot be considered as harmed by environmentally
destructive actions if those actions also bring into existence different peo-
ple than would otherwise have existed), sufficientarianism specifies a
threshold conception of harm, by which we can harm and fail to be just
to future people if our actions cause them to “fall below the specified
standard” of well-being.65
However, this position is by no means identical to what might be ter-
med “enoughism”. Our view is that the concept of “enough” should be
61. Gosseries (2008: 64).
62. Locke, The Second Treatise, Chapter 5, paragraph 27, in Laslett (1960).
63. Gosseries (2008: 69).
64. Meyer, Lukas H., and Roser, Dominic, “Enough for the Future”, Gosseries and
Meyer (2009: 243).
65. Meyer and Roser (2009: 229).
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central to political thought, non-negotiably so in an age of limits to
growth.66 Contrary to the central assumptions of neo-classical eco-
nomics, humans should not be conceived as having unlimited wants and
desires, but as being capable of satiety and fulfilment.67 We think, as will
become clear momentarily, that sufficientarianism risks taking insuffi-
ciently seriously what for us is central: the open-ended commitment we
have or ought to have to making things genuinely better for our descen-
dants. But we also think that sufficientarianism tends not to take seriously
enough its own alleged emphasis on enough being enough where cur-
rent generations are the recipients of justice: insofar as it allows endless
material/consumerist expansion beyond the point of sufficiency. Accord-
ing to such a view then, sufficiency defines a threshold for what is owed
to people as a matter of justice, but not a limit on what they are at lib-
erty to appropriate. While “enoughism” would centre on a threshold
which does not need to be exceeded, sufficientarianism tends to be the
opposite – a threshold which can be exceeded as much as anyone wants.
Moreover, as we discuss in Section II.iv, sufficientarianism still implies
a very much more limited set of obligations towards future generations.
For example, as Gosseries points out of Brundtland’s sufficientarianism,
“once everyone’s needs are covered, fairness does not require any further
redistribution”.68 And their appeal in dealing with non-identity draws its
strength, we would argue, from starting to recognise aspects of the kind
of developmental metaphor we have been advocating, that is, the unidi-
rectionality of time.69 But, by failing to acknowledge the metaphor and
by continuing to shoehorn such characteristics into the language of dis-
tribution, they create a misleading picture and, we will suggest, a serious
risk of us not doing enough for future generations.
Let us illustrate the points of these last few paragraphs by indulging
in an analogy. We plant a rosemary bush. There are a few small sprigs,
say five, in the first year, and we know the bush will grow many more
next year. How many should we take now? If we try to think in terms
of an even distribution over time, we will encounter problems. Left as
66. See Meadows et al. (2005: 11 and Chapter 7, especially 238–240) and Scott Cato
(1999: 42–44).
67. Daly and Cobb (1990: 85).
68. Gosseries (2008: 69).
69. This unidirectionality yields something else of importance hereabouts: a way in
which one can generate a (ceteris paribus) reason for thinking that we ought to expect to
be able to make things better for the next generation, even once we have jettisoned dangerous
myths of “progress”. The reason is this: one should expect that, other things being equal,
human knowledge and wisdom will gradually improve, simply by virtue of us being his-
torical beings, who can learn; including learning from our mistakes. (This argument is
made in greater detail in Read’s “Wittgenstein and the illusion of “progress”: On real pol-
itics and real philosophy in a world of technocracy”, forthcoming in Philosophy.)
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is, and tended to, the bush may have, say, four times as many sprigs
next year and we will be able to harvest more. But if we try and
achieve a broadly equal distribution of harvest across time by taking five
now, and five next year, our plant will probably die. We could take
three or four sprigs, and then try to take the same amount next year,
but our plant probably will not be very healthy, may still die, and there
are likely to be far fewer than twenty sprigs next year. What we need
to do is take an amount that will not impede the growth and integrity
of the plant – that is, maybe one sprig. Then next year we can take at
least five times the amount (i.e. five sprigs) without impeding its
growth or health. Of course we could, then, try to frame this distribu-
tion in sufficientarian terms – that we should limit the number of sprigs
that we pick now to the number that will allow future harvests to be
sufficient, because the plant’s health has not been impeded. But then
why is it helpful any longer to think primarily in terms of distribution?
The underlying concern here is the changing health of the plant; its
growth and development. And the danger is that if we attach too
strongly to the distributional concern under even the sufficientarian
approach, our attention is overly drawn to attaining particular limited
outcomes; to doing just enough to achieve these, and deriving the maxi-
mum benefits we can here and now within these limits, when this may
in fact mean that the health of the plant itself is always precarious,
rather than flourishing.
Clearly, in this case it is we that benefit both now and in the future;
one might object that we are simply acting in our longer term self-
interest, dis-analogously to the case of future generations. But the point
of this particular analogy is not motivational (for those considerations
see our discussion in II.iv, below); rather it is to highlight the limits in
and to understanding the process of development over time predominantly distri-
butionally. And the risks in focusing exclusively on this way of thinking
are particularly cause for deep concern when the analogy is scaled up
to consider our obligations to future generations with regard to the
ecological conditions in which they will emerge. Given especially the
facts of ecosystemic complexity and conditions of uncertainty, we there-
fore suggest that we need to give more primacy to moral metaphors
that capture the underlying developmental dynamic, and focus instead
on marrying the behaviours of present generations to the evolving
health of the ecological systems that we (and future generations will)
depend on.
The limits of the distributive metaphor for intergenerational moral
relations, as expressed in various theories of justice, is, however, com-
pounded by the adherence of such theories to a further, procedural, set
of metaphors which we briefly outlined in II.ii. We turn to this now.
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II. iv The Procedural Justice Metaphor(s)
What underpins particular principles of distributional justice is often a
further claim that the principles must be derived from procedurally just
circumstances, methods or institutions.70 Anand and Sen, for example,
follow their contention (cited above) that future people’s needs must be
met via intergenerational distributional justice by suggesting that this
must constitute “sharing the capacity for well-being between present
people and future people in an acceptable way. . . which neither the pre-
sent generation nor. . .future generations can readily reject”.71 Such theo-
ries rely on procedural justice metaphors of contract and negotiation as
neutral procedures that provide conditions of impartiality for determining
and justifying principles of distribution (i.e. those in the contract tradi-
tions).
This group of theories, as Gardiner has discussed in detail,72 is subject
in particular to what Page called the “problem of non-reciprocity”,
which we noted earlier stems from the existence of non-overlapping
generations. The theories most familiarly susceptible to this problem are
those based on “mutual advantage”; the idea that “a “rational” agent –
i.e. one acting exclusively out of self-interest – will serve his best interest
by engaging in a co-operative venture and submitting to certain social
rules accordingly”.73 Mutual advantage follows directly in the Hobbesian
social contract tradition in requiring that rules must be in the best inter-
ests of all who co-operate, and that this is what provides the reason for
them to do so.74 This is a problem in the intergenerational sphere
because justice conceived as a mutually beneficial arrangement cannot be
applied.75 For, as Gardiner has argued in the case of dangerous climate
70. One notable exception here is Nussbaum, who explicitly eschews contractarian, pro-
cedural approaches, and for that reason we find her account of justice a significant
improvement on others, and are extremely sympathetic to her capabilities approach.
However, her understanding of justice is problematic in continuing to be wedded to the
neutralist framework of political liberalism. Further, her account of what is owed to recip-
ients of justice is conceived in terms of “objective” entitlements to key capabilities, precisely
as opposed to “compassion and humanity” (Nussbaum 2006: 336–337).
71. Anand and Sen (2000: 2038).
72. Gardiner, Stephen, “A Contract on Future Generations?”, Gosseries and Meyer
(2009).
73. Gosseries (2008: 64).
74. Barry (1995: 31); Gardiner (2009: 79).
75. Rights-based accounts share aspects of the procedural justice metaphor in this
respect. As Jonas (1985: 38–39) has highlighted, “the traditional idea of rights and duties”
is “grounded upon reciprocity, according to which my duty is the counterpart of
another’s right, which in turn is seen as the like of my own right. . .”. “This scheme fails”
in the case of future generations since the “nonexistent” do not yet have rights (until they
exist) and cannot have reciprocal duties to us; the rights/duties scheme therefore needs to
be significantly revised so as to preclude the possibility of asking the question, “What has
the future ever done for me? Does it respect my rights?”.
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change, “control of the situation rests completely within the current gen-
eration”.76 In this case, since the current generation has already inherited
an overpolluted planet, it is not in its (narrowly conceived, at least) self-
interest to “co-operate” with future generations – it “will achieve noth-
ing for itself by holding back”.77 As has been well noted, there is no
guarantee that the rules will be respected and that some generations will
not free ride, since non-contemporary generations cannot provide
enforcement.78 Proponents of the theory are forced to tenuously assume
that mutuality and/or enforcement can be provided via the overlapping
of generations.79
Similar problems occur, as Gardiner has noted, for theories based on
reciprocity, and contract theorists such as Rawls. Page argues that the
problem for reciprocity-based theories can be largely circumvented by
some version of an “international stewardship”80 modification, at least in
the case of public goods such as having a “hospitable climate system”.81
This means, as we noted in the previous section, that we “reciprocate”
to the previous generations for benefits they left us not directly to them,
but “indirectly” by passing on benefits to future generations,82 so that
reciprocity is understood in terms of “fairness” rather than mutual “self-
interest”.83 But this move to “indirect reciprocity” glosses over the funda-
mentally asymmetrical and non-reciprocal relationship between genera-
tions, since it is not then clear that indirect reciprocity should still count
as reciprocity at all. The move here (as with the assumption above of
mutuality/enforcement via overlapping generations) is artificial; it treats
this rather central feature of intertemporal relationships as a challenge84
for existing theories of contemporary moral relations to overcome and
adapt to, rather than, as we are doing, foregrounding it as a central fea-
ture of intergenerational relationships which appropriate moral metaphors
should be defined by. This is, we suggest, a classic example of how a
76. Apart from, that is, where generations overlap, when Gardiner supposes that there is
some degree of reciprocity in preserving the advantage of social cooperation. See Gardiner
(2004: 30).
77. Gardiner (2004: 30).
78. Gosseries (2008: 64–65); Gardiner (2009) and Barry (1995: 33) also raise similar con-
cerns with free-riding even among contemporaries where people are assumed to be either
self-interested or in single-minded pursuit of their own ends (p37).
79. See Gardiner (2009: 99–108) for a discussion of some significant inadequacies. The
inadequacies are stark when it comes to serious lengths of time. Consider, for example,
the asymmetry of benefits and costs in relation to a nuclear power station: this produces
energy for 30 years and leaves waste for 300 000 years.
80. Page (2007: 232–238).
81. Page (2007: 234).
82. Page (2007: 232–233).
83. Page (2007: 227).
84. This is in fact how Gosseries and Meyer (2009: 3) have explicitly described it.
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frame/paradigm (here, that of reciprocity) constrains and deforms one’s
thinking, to the point of absurdity. By contrast, we might reasonably
expect that “indirect reciprocity”, to represent any form of reciprocation
at all, should mean something like: I reciprocate something good that
you have done for me by doing something good for your sister, who
then does something good for you. A larger scale example that might
plausibly still count as indirect reciprocity might be Local Exchange
Trading Schemes (LETS),85 in which members provide goods and ser-
vices (e.g. plumbing, gardening, tutoring. . .) to one another “for free”,
in the knowledge that they can receive “free” services from other mem-
bers as and when they need, within reason. But by the time one moves
past such a closed system to movements such as Pay It Forward,86 where
individuals are encouraged to “repay” good deeds done to them by simi-
larly helping others, it is unclear that this is indirect reciprocity any
longer. Such a movement is supposedly constructed in the language of
reciprocity, but since (unlike in the previous cases) one does not expect
to receive anything further back, it is motivated primarily by being
inspired from care shown to oneself to go on to care for and to help
others. In other words, it is transitional away from contract-based meta-
phors grounded in mutual self-interest and towards perspectives based on
altruism, care and empathy.
The problems stem from theoretical over-attachment to these central
metaphors of justice themselves. Within the contract tradition, what is
fair is based on what is decided in a neutrally structured negotiation, or
in something like a court. In the course of the negotiation or the court
proceedings, one deploys principles to make one’s case. These principles,
ideally, secure a reasonable agreement (some would argue, a “rational”
agreement). This is the basis for most “social contract” thinking, and
quite explicitly, of course, for Rawls’s pseudo-jurisprudential “pure pro-
cedural justice”. And, as Foster remarks: “[There is no fairness], there are
no genuinely equitable relations, except within the present”.87 Contrac-
tarianism or contractualism, such as Rawlsian “ideal theory”, takes as its
standard case such relations within the present.
The true depth of the problem is almost recognised by Gardiner,
who argues that this kind of problem creates an “Idealization Dilemma”
for contract theories.88 If, he argues, as in contractarianism, “the basic
claims about cooperation are supposed to be matters of descriptive fact”
then “if it were to turn out that the basic claims fail to carry over to
85. See http://www.letslinkuk.net/.
86. See http://www.pif.org.uk/.
87. Cf. e.g. p.116 of John Foster’s (2008).
88. Gardiner (2009: 93).
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the intergenerational setting. . . then it seems that one would be forced
to conclude that the contractarian model fails to apply”. We would
then need to reject the particular contract model, or even conclude
“that some other kind of moral theory altogether must be invoked”.
However, he suggests that “on a paradigm contractualist theory, the
basic claims about co-operation need not describe matters of fact, but
rather merely report how the situation arising between various parties
ought to be conceived.”89 But further, he argues, even contractarians can
adopt this kind of contractualist “idealization strategy”, in that “the
alleged ‘descriptive facts’ against which contractarians judge their theo-
ries are not the facts of the world that we live in, but the hypothetical
world of the state of nature.”.90 Yet, as Gardiner then points out, this
response alone is insufficient; contract theorists must also show that it is
“both possible and appropriate to conceive of that [intergenerational issue]
in those terms. . . For some descriptive facts about the world are suffi-
ciently deep that they play a role in defining the problem at hand: that
is, they are essential to the normative definition of the problem as the
kind of problem it is”.
This is precisely our concern. And our contention has been that,
while one can attempt to twist contract metaphors so as to show them as
“possible and appropriate” for framing intergenerational moral relation-
ships, the “paradigm” has become monstrous, in a case like this. It
requires desperately trying to force things into a certain mould, and the
effort to preserve its framing metaphors has ceased, by this point, to be
of any help to clarity. Disappointingly, Gardiner pulls his punches and
stops short of concluding anything of this kind, instead arguing that “If
the pure intergenerational problem is really a particular kind of collective
action problem, then there is reason to think that the contract theory
approach can be resurrected”,91 for example, by a “better theory of chain
connection” (i.e. of why different generations should cooperate, so far
only grounded via generational overlap). But this reluctance on Gar-
diner’s part to go as far as he ought is unsurprising given that he operates
within the tradition of moral theorising, and the notion of moral meta-
phor (as non-exclusive, such that we do not completely reject the con-
tract metaphor as such, but argue that there are other, more helpful
metaphors for our moral thinking here which more focally deserve our
attention) is not available to him.
89. Ibid. We are suggesting that it ought to be conceived differently. That the kind of
thinking to be found in George Lakoff’s Moral politics (Chicago: U. Chicago, 2010) and in
Wittgenstein’s entire corpus suggest a different kind of starting point from contractualist
theorising.
90. Gardiner (2009: 94).
91. Gardiner (2009: 116).
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So let us respond to a possible objection, which follows Gardiner’s
suggestion that contract theory need not describe real-world facts but an
idealised conception of how we ought to think of things intergenera-
tionally. Our concerns, above, along with Foster, that there are “no gen-
uinely equitable relations, except within the present” might be thought
questionable in that it is arguably precisely when unequal power imbal-
ances exist that we require impartial reasoning from imagined scenarios
which structurally model true conditions of fairness (as in, for example,
Rawls’s hypothetical original position); to show what fair outcomes that
represent the interests of all would be. This would equally, it might fur-
ther be argued, be the case in scenarios amongst contemporaries where
there exist power imbalances: a dictator dealing with an oppressed popu-
lation, a master’s dealings with a slave. We surely need to be able to crit-
icise these as unjust.
However, in such scenarios we can imagine that the situation can in
principle become procedurally just; that relationships between the power-
ful and powerless might (after campaigns, protest, external intervention)
alter, through liberation of the powerless. The slave might be freed, the
torture victim may get their day in court, facing their tormentor. But
there are cases in which these things are not imaginable. There is simply
no way in which non-human animals can even in principle negotiate
with humans to alter their conditions of power inequality. And people a
100 years hence have absolutely no way of seeking justice vis-a-vis
things that we have done to them. Such basic conditions cannot change
and become “structurally just”. Those who are wholly within our power,
it seems, do not comfortably fit the metaphor of procedural justice.
Conditions here do not – and cannot ever – constitute conditions of
fairness. And our primary concern here is the presumption that what is
required is, in the first place, moral reasoning from impartiality, rather
than from care. Part of the proceduralist intuition here seems to be pro-
vide reasons for non-moral actors (e.g. self-interested actors in positions
of power) to be motivated to take on board the interests of others as
valid. But here there is always the risk of “bad faith”; that in moving
from the assumption of self-interest to transposing that to real or imag-
ined conditions of fairness or neutrality (whether through mutual advan-
tage, reciprocity or devices such as the original position), self-interest can
trump92 (e.g. through free-riding). Why not recognise that our underly-
ing motivation for wanting to take the interests of the disempowered
into account in the first place is because we care about them? Why try to
92. Groves (2014) helpfully terms this a form of “moral corruption”, “in which the
temptation is to privilege the short-term interests of present people over any potentially
longer-term obligations” (p. 22).
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be impartial? Why not instead be more honest about our moral motiva-
tions, and reason (and encourage reasoning) directly from care rather than
from a mitigatory ethic that relies on (at least the hypothetical presump-
tion of) mutual self-interest?
And this will, therefore, also often be true in the case of relationships
between contemporaries. While it may be possible to make a case in
some scenarios amongst contemporaries that the conditions of procedural
justice can (unlike for future generations) be created and (as we suggested
in the Section II.ii) some conception of fairness meaningfully be appealed
to, even here, what is often (and should) surely be motivating even these
concerns (if indeed they are genuine concerns rather than a cynical move
to protect one’s own interests in the longer term93 ) is a care for those
others who might potentially have been unjustly treated.94 And such
motivations as underpinning and justifying this procedural justice must,
surely, be emphasised and encouraged if such a system is to be lasting
and stable; otherwise the cynical position will always give rise to occa-
sions of free-riding and defection from cooperation with just procedures
if self-interest is particularly strong. But there are also some cases of rela-
tionships between contemporaries where, as with relationships between
(non-overlapping) generations, we can make no sense in principle of
how the relationship might be “improved” so as to become procedurally
just.
Take what may be a more intuitive example from existing experience.
Treating one’s baby merely “fairly” would be (considered – rightly)
abominable. Yes, babies will one day grow up to be our equals (unless –
and this is crucial, of course – we prevent them from growing up to do
so) and yes, technically, babies are already in some sense our competitors
for certain resources; parents to an extent must balance their own needs
against those of their baby. But to think of them primarily via this meta-
phor fails to understand the dynamic of the parent-child relationship,
where the needs of the child redirect and reorder the wants and priorities
of the parent, on whom the (young) child is utterly dependent.95 Parents
act appropriately when they do what they can to care for their child,
and are fundamentally motivated by love for them. Their relative posi-
tion of power does not trigger duties of fairness. Dividing food or
warmth or shelter or whatever it might be “fairly,” in such a circum-
stance would make one question the ability of the parent to appropri-
93. Because, say, one thinks that the application of these rules will benefit oneself in the
future.
94. We are here alluding to care ethics (as developed in the work of, for example, Carol
Gilligan, Sarah Ruddick and Michael Slote).
95. This is not to advocate a self-sacrificing model of parenthood, which has historically
been used to oppress women, subsuming their identities in their role as mother.
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ately care for the child. Such “fairness” is a standing invitation to bad
faith; because there can be no “contract” here, no agreement, no negoti-
ation: just whatever you decide “is” fair. But it is hardly fair for fairness
to be a matter of the utterly powerful dictating to the utterly powerless.
It is the rankest idealism to pretend otherwise: to pretend that one is
likely to be fair, when one controls the very conditions of existence of
the other, and is motivated only by cool fairness (and not by a prior
“warmer”96 motivation for why one should be fair). That is to say that if
one starts (as Rawls, within the original position at least, and other con-
tractualists do, with their assumption of mutual disinterest) by assuming
we are only interested in ourselves, and then try to “balance” this “fairly”
against others’ “self-interest”, then a tacit invitation to bad faith is pre-
sent. There is nothing to keep one’s alleged rationality on the rails.97 It
is better to genuinely care about the other and proactively act in their
interests. . . Only then can you be truly “fair” to future generations: gen-
uine fairness has to be motivated by an ethic of care. Once more then, justice
is not a primary virtue (and in that sense certainly not the “first” virtue);
we are just, if we are, ultimately, because we care. This cannot be derived
from arbitrating between different self-interests. There is something more
basic than (justice as) fairness, without which fairness does not even get
going. . .and that something is something like: care.
Another analogy may help things here. Solow had referred earlier
(see Section II.iii) to a theoretical “fair minded judge”. But this is remi-
niscent of the biblical story of the judgement of Solomon, which offers
a useful metaphor. In the story, two women both claim to be the
mother of a baby and ask King Solomon to adjudicate. Solomon then
feigns a threatened “fair” solution to determine the baby’s true mother,
ordering: “Cut the living child in two and give half to one and half to
the other”. While the false mother agrees with the ruling as a fair solu-
tion, the true mother “was deeply moved out of love for her son and
said to the king, “Please, my lord, give her the living baby! Don’t kill
him!” But the other said, “Neither I nor you shall have him. Cut him
in two!”.98 Thus, the king recognises the true mother for her concern
for the welfare of the baby – her recognition that its worth and value
96. For some explication of the quite-reasonable deep-seatedness of the connection
between justice and coldness and between care and warmth, see http://chelseagreen.com/
blogs/georgelakoff/2010/02/22/george-lakoff-why-rational-reason-doesnt-work-in-con-
temporary-politics/ and http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2011/11/04/a-
brief-guide-to-embodied-cognition-why-you-are-not-your-brain/. For the full back-
ground, see Lakoff’s work, including his co-authored books with Nunez and of course
with Johnson.
97. Such cases of failures of fairness based on alleged rationality alone are legion. Argu-
ably, they include most extant climate treaties, for instance.
98. 1, Kings 3:24–27, New International Version.
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lies in its continued health, and that it is not the kind of thing that can
be divided fairly and impartially. We think much the same of the health
of our descendants. Specifically: Using the criterion of fairness to bal-
ance between us and them is liable to be equivalent to sawing them in
two. However, the wisdom of real care involves a vital generosity of
spirit.
Thus, the importance of a care-based metaphor will hold even for
some contemporary relations. It should constitute an important supple-
mentary metaphor to that of procedural justice, we would suggest, even
in the cases we noted earlier, such as relationships between oppressors
and the oppressed. What is missing in these cases is mutual care, and it
is this that must underlie any genuine structural conditions of equity
that might eventually pertain once the oppressive institutions have been
overcome. But, it is even more important in the case of those contem-
porary relationships where there are two utter unequals, between
whom there can be no fairness, no genuine equity. The metaphor
needs to be central in the case of long-term intergenerational relation-
ships (and those between humans and non-humans) where (unlike in
the case of parents and children) the power dynamic cannot even shift
over time.
In this sense, what Page called the “problem of non-reciprocity” is
only a problem for those that think primarily in terms of procedural jus-
tice; non-reciprocity is not problematic when we think in terms of care.
(Thus, the use of the term “problem” is revealing: It reveals the need for
the “paradigm shift” that we are arguing for here) The shift in emphasis
also reveals an additional concern with the Lockean Proviso, and
Brundtland’s (as well as other, general, forms of) sufficientarianism, a
concern which compounds our earlier worry in Section II.iii about their
attachment to the distributional metaphor. This is that such approaches
are motivated by thinking about what we can get as limited by what we
need to give/leave to “others” – a presumption in favour of the (nar-
rowly construed interests of the) present, and of sustaining and maintain-
ing current systems, which may not in fact protect the interests of future
generations. We need, rather, to care for them.
We turn now to outline in more detail the kind of approach
which we believe should be taken, to more centrally recognise the
asymmetry that is characteristic of the various (otherwise “challeng-
ing”99 ) features of our intergenerational moral relationships and our
obligations to improve ecological conditions for the well-being of
future generations.
99. As characterised by e.g. Gosseries and Meyer (2009: 3).
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III. Becoming the future
What we have in mind is that caring for the future is a way of “mid-
wifing” the development of the future as emanating from – being
“birthed”100 from – the present. And the underlying problem for con-
ventional approaches to intergenerational relations, we suggest, is that
Rawls’s philosophy (as well as that of Solow, Page, Gosseries and of
all these philosophers of intergenerational justice) is “ideal theory,”101
and yet the main bases for such “ideal theory” are quite clearly the con-
cerns of the present. When Rawls et al. think of the future, it is primar-
ily, as it were, as a quasi-spatial extension of the present.102 It is not
just then that one is faced with a tension between ideal theory and
non-ideal politics, which can seem to resolve into a tension between
intergenerational justice and social justice, or even between intergener-
ational justice and present-day selfishness. The fundamental problem, as
we see it, is that thinking through the prism of “intergenerational jus-
tice” or “intergenerational equity” is itself already “unjust” to future peo-
ple, to the true nature of our concern for the flourishing and
development of a future we can be proud of fostering. That is, It does
not do them justice. . . Because to think in terms of intergenerational
justice is still covertly to think in a present-centric way. Because jus-
tice-thinking is modelled, structured, both on thinking that works for
distribution and via negotiation, between (some) people who are alive.
If one is really to give future people their due, one needs to think in
a different way. One needs to think time, not space. One needs to
think beyond “distribution”, beyond impartial negotiation, and thus
beyond “fairness”.103
Our moral obligations to future generations should instead be seen,
firstly, developmentally rather than distributionally. That is, developing
(our) society in a way that protects and enhances its ecological pre-con-
ditions to enable its continued functioning and flourishing, with any cur-
rent “costs” considered in terms of how they alter its development, rather
than straightforwardly as burdens that might be fairly or unfairly “dis-
100. Such terms may well appear odd and somewhat alien to the more analytical dis-
course of much of academic philosophy. But the change in ethos that we are advocating
in political philosophy is partially constituted by (and can only be adequately communi-
cated via) a shift in language – away from apparently impartial terminology to something
more evocative.
101. See p.8f. of Rawls (1971).
102. Even if Rawls, as noted earlier (Section II.iii), is occasionally at pains to emphasise
the unidirectionality of time (1971: 291), he is still, as we have suggested, wedded to
metaphors that make this difficult to take seriously.
103. Bearing in mind of course here Rawls’s famous formulation of “justice as fairness”.
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tributed” intergenerationally.104 And this relies, secondly, not on reason-
ing impartially under “fair” conditions, but on reasoning in terms of care
and love, roughly modelled on the relationships between parents and
their children.
We now sketch these kinds of alternative metaphors that we think
essential for an ecologically sane political philosophy, that is, to capture
those necessary features of intergenerational moral relationships ignored
by the (currently dominant) distributive and procedural justice meta-
phors. This is the major positive outcome of the present paper; it aims
to open up a new research-agenda.
What we have suggested is mischaracterised by those (i.e. justice-
based) approaches that are currently dominant but whose paradigm is in
crisis, is, above all, a deep conceptual recognition of the asymmetry and
directionality of our relationship with the future. That is, an understand-
ing of future generations not as another distinct group of people(s)
located elsewhere in time as opposed to space, but as “sequentially” and
(ultimately) utterly asymmetrically dependent on us for the conditions in
which they live. This dependency should be understood not simply (as
under distributive justice) in terms of their being recipients of capital,
but in the sense that they emerge from us and our world; the form of
their societies, the health of their ecosystems and their very identities are
at stake. This is in contrast to the distributive “saving” metaphor which
implies a stockpile of goods, set aside and given to/saved up for future
generations. Rather, over time our generation becomes them.105 Their
planet is also ours, as it changes and (hopefully mostly) stays the same.
Under this approach, we need to consider our moral obligations to
future generations and the prevention of harms in terms of investing in
and shaping future conditions for flourishing – our responsibility for how
our world will become – rather than considering future generations as
competitors for intertemporal resources. Any gardener will be familiar
with this way of thinking, exemplified through the rosemary bush anal-
104. This does not justify just any costs; there must be a genuine just transition, since we
cannot (literally) immediately live within our ecological means without fundamentally
threatening the existence of society, and in this sense, the “costs” of mitigation are spread
across, for example, perhaps a generation.
105. In saying this, we have some sympathy with De Shalit’s notion of a transgenerational
community, as “one that extends into the future” (De Shalit, Avner (1995:12), Why Poster-
ity Matters: Environmental policies and future generations, ed. Andrew Brennan, London and
New York: Routledge). However, De Shalit oddly uses this to justify considering our
obligations to near future generations in terms of intergenerational distributive justice (i.e.
since they are a part of the transgenerational community, where conditions of justice
apply), which is very different to our “developmental” approach. That is, De Shalit does
not succeed in effecting a “paradigm shift”; he remains captured by distributive and spatial
metaphors, even as he seeks to overcome their limitations.
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ogy described above. For the land to support life in the future requires
time and money to be spent working the soil, enriching it with compost,
manure etc., planting seeds (which means, if they are from a previous
crop, not consuming them) so that they can grow productively in subse-
quent years. More will be harvested in the future than now but this is a
defining feature of the (directional) process. And this means holding back
from some “opportunities” now in the use of particular “resources” such
as the greenhouse-gas absorption capacity to ensure that future lives are
liveable, “even if” quality of life ends up being better subsequently than
ours is now.106
For us to do this even when we ourselves will not directly benefit
then involves moving beyond procedural justice contract metaphors of
reasoning via impartiality between self-interested parties. It involves a
“bias” towards the future; an attitude of love/care to future generations,
as Jonas has suggested, analogously to our relationship with our chil-
dren.107 Future generations (including the wider ecological community)
are not our competitors because they are the development (the continua-
tion into the future) of our communities.
Jonas argues in fact – and we agree – that the parent–child relation is
an archetype of responsibility. . .:
When asked for a single instance (one is enough to break the ontologi-
cal dogma) where the coincidence of the “is” and “ought” occurs, we
can point at the most familiar sight: the newborn, whose mere breath-
ing uncontradictably addresses an ought to the world around, namely,
to take care of him.108
This is not even an “entreaty” because the infant cannot yet entreat
us. Future people are quieter still – and thus even more in need of our
“responsiveness”. The only key point on which we differ from Jonas is
on the centrality of the cultivation of a generosity of spirit, a spirit of care
(or love):
Thus no mention [need be] made of sympathy, pity, or whichever of
the emotions may come into play on our part, and not even love.109
106. At this point, as a reality-check, we should remark that of course on a business-as-
usual model our descendants (if they exist at all) will end up far worse off than we are. A
desperately sad situation: one which requires us to give our all to avoid it, at the cost
otherwise of emptying our own lives of worth, decency and meaning.
107. Jonas (1985: 39). Cf. also Groves’s argument of his (2014:132–3).
108. Jonas (1985: 131).
109. Ibid. Interestingly for present purposes, given our criticisms of Rawls’s contractualism
above, Jonas goes on thus: “But precisely this in its wholly contingent uniqueness is that
to which responsibility is now committed – the only case where the “cause” one serves
has nothing to do with appraisal of worthiness, nothing with comparison, and nothing with
contract.” (134–5; emphasis ours) . . .Not at all the “only case”, we think, but surely (as
Jonas says previously) a kind of an “archetype”.
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In a certain sense, Jonas then goes even further than we do. He thinks
that the fact of the world in itself simply gives us an absolute responsibil-
ity to take responsibility for those utterly dependent upon us. However,
we advise the call of and the cultivation of care and the like (i.e. love).
The facticity of the world and its creatures may give one what both
Jonas and we want – but only if the right kind of attention is paid to it,
to them, to us (all). Caring, or loving attention.
Thus, while Jonas calls for a new ethic of responsibility that he thinks
emerges directly from the objects of that responsibility, we call for that
ethic of responsibility to be an ethic of care,110 and insist that it requires
the active involvement and “acknowledgement” of all of us. We need to
develop the future out of ourselves, as carers do.
But it will be objected once again that it is one thing to love one’s
children, or even children in general, and quite another to love nameless,
faceless future people. Especially given that we cannot know for certain
that they will come to exist at all. Compare here the following useful
remarks of Joel Feinberg’s:
Unborn generations are more remotely potential than fetuses in one
sense, but not in another. A much greater period of time with a far
greater number of causally necessary and important events must pass
before their potentiality can be actualized, it is true: but our collective
posterity is just as certain to come into existence “in the normal course
of events” as is any given fetus now in its mother’s womb. In that sense
the existence of the distant human future is no more remotely potential
than that of a particular child already on its way.111
But, it might be said, over a generation since Feinberg wrote this, we
now do worry whether in the normal course of events collective poster-
ity is certain. Yet: if a parent knows that the life of their unborn child is
under threat, this does not inevitably result in their becoming distanced
from it, preparing to give it up. On the contrary, it might motivate the
parents to care for it all the more intently, to protect it. Similarly: the fact
that future generations are under threat is no reason for diminishing our
degree of love and care for them. On the contrary, it gives us a motiva-
tion to care for them all the more intently. We can awaken to our latent
care for the future, if we pay attention to its needs, its fragility. Its very
110. And here of course we are in part influenced by the epochal work, revisionary of
the basis of justice-thinking, of Gilligan (See e.g. Gilligan (2011)). But we go beyond this,
in finding Gilligan still too beholden to “justice”.
111. Feinberg, J., “The rights of animals and unborn generations”, in Partridge (1981).
Feinberg, as one might put it, sees correctly the concrete potentiality of future people (as
opposed to the merely abstract potentiality of hypothetical, imaginary beings conjured in
thought experiments as possible bearers of justice, such as, say, GM-created centaurs).
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fragility, like that of a newborn, can awaken us to love for it. And that,
at last, might be enough.
IV. Conclusion
We acknowledge the attractions of the idea that justice-thinking should
dominate ethical thinking about future generations. The notion of justice
can seem to be especially appropriate hereabouts, since it can be under-
stood impersonally. It can seem obvious that, with regard to future gen-
erations, there’s none of the individual morality we have in the present:
because future generations are amorphous. Because who exactly they are
is not yet decided, and because we cannot in any case relate to them in
their concrete particularity (yet). There is only future-generations-as-a-
whole; and our responsibilities towards them can (so it is said, or
assumed) be understood fully by extending justice-thinking – and espe-
cially, distributive-justice-thinking – to cover them.
In the present paper, we have argued that this line of thinking fails to
take account of the deep reasons why justice-thinking does not succeed
in capturing what we owe to future generations, and indeed in crucial
respects fares much worse with regard to thinking about the future than
it does even with regard to thinking about the present (Unsurprisingly
perhaps: since the present was what it was devised to deal with). We
have argued that justice-thinking, while purportedly simply sensitive to
the difficulties that there are in empathising with future people, actually
magnifies – exacerbates – those difficulties, including through its very
(proceduralist) “impartialism,” which ends up being an open (though of
course tacit) invitation to bad faith, not taking into account the entire
dependence of the future upon the present. We have argued further that
the crucial “distributive justice” frame in particular actually cannot bring
into focus the most salient aspects of our comportment with regard to
future generations. For future generations should not be thought of as a
distinct society or group living at a different temporal “location,” but as
what/who we will become, emerging from our generation, and the future
identity of our society(ies). And this has the implication that the frame of
“justice” is much less appropriate for our relations to them than the
frame of “care”. As is the case with regard to infants. After all, the rela-
tive “unformedness” of our children at their birth does not reduce or
occlude our level of care for them: on the very contrary.
Once we recall that future generations grow from and are formed by
the structures and conditions of current generations, the dynamic is not
simply a question of harms to “them” vs. harms to “us”. Indeed, the
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
32 Philosophical Investigations
very idea of separating “them” out from “us” starts to dissolve on one.
Rather, the focus of decision-making that ethically recognises future
generations should be on how we can effect a transition to enable us to
live within our ecological limits and the boundaries of our global com-
mons, to enable “them” to flourish. But this is not a question of what
we should give and take, but of the society and wider ecological com-
munity we want to co-create and to be. It is, therefore, also the question
of how we can become the future. How we can effect the transition from
the present to the future demos.
What the future needs is not just justice, but, much more, care ethics.
A care ethic, in fact, oriented specifically towards the future.
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